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The Impact of U.S. Control

of Foreign Assets on Refugees
and Expatriates
Michael P. Malloy*

INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Treasury Department has the responsibility of administering
several emergency-related programs that affect the property of certain
countries (and usually the nationals thereof) designated by its regulations,
where the property, or the persons dealing with the property, are subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States. These so-called "embargo controls"
consist of trade sanctions (i.e., an "embargo" in the narrow sense of the
term) and prohibitions on transactions involving assets in which the designated country or its nationals have any interest. These prohibitions,
known collectively as a "blocking" of assets, have an impact on refugees
and expatriates, usually taking one or more of the following forms: (1)
blocking of U.S. assets in which such individuals have a direct interest,
until they have established residence outside the blocked country; (2)
indefinite blocking of U.S. assets of business entities in which they have
an interest; (3) blocking of certain U.S. assets in which they would normally assert a right as heirs or legatees; and (4) prohibiting use of blocked
assets of their country of origin to satisfy their claims against that country.
This article examines U.S. control of foreign assets in light of the consequences for refugees and expatriates.
Three sets of such controls arise under the Trading With the Enemy
Act. ' The Foreign Assets Control Regulations 2 cover transactions involving property in which North Korea, Vietnam, or Cambodia, or any national
* Attorney-Adviser (Finance), Securities Disclosure Division, Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, U.S. Department of the Treasury. Formerly Attorney-Adviser, Office of
Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury (1977-1980); research associate,
Institute of International Law and Economic Development, Washington, D.C. (1976-1977).
B.A., Georgetown University (1973); J.D., University of Pennsylvania (1976). The views
expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the
position of the Department of the Treasury or any office or agency thereof.
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thereof, has had any interest since the relevant effective date with respect
to each designated country. 3 These regulations were issued after President
Truman's 1950 proclamation of a national emergency in connection with
the Korean conflict. 4 (At that time the regulations designated only the
People's Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea. The controls with
respect to the PRC were substantially cut back in May 1971,5 and finally
lifted on January 31, 1980.6)
In essence, the regulations constitute a virtually complete trade and
financial embargo of these countries for all purposes. The basic provision
is paragraph (b) of section 500.201 of the regulations. 7 For present purposes, it may be paraphrased as follows: persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction
are prohibited, unless licensed by Treasury, from engaging in any transaction or transfer with respect to any property in which any designated
country or its nationals have any interest of any nature whatsoever.
The key terms here are "transfer," 8 "property," 9 and "interest" 10 in
property of the designated country or national. The scope of these terms
as interpreted by the courts is broad enough to make illegal any direct or
indirect transaction involving anything of value, between a person subject
to U.S. jurisdiction and a designated country or national. This broad scope
has resulted in the proscription of such transactions as the importation of
goods of designated-country origin, even where title had already passed
to a third-country national, 11 the passage of title to property of deceased
designated-country nationals by intestate succession, 12 and the transfer of
a gift intended for a designated country for humanitarian purposes. 13 Of
course, the major effect of the prohibition remains the "blocking" of property in which there is an interest of a designated country or its nationals; 14
that is, no transaction involving property subject to the regulations can
occur without a Treasury license.
The provisions of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations ' 5 are virtually
identical to those of the Foreign Assets Control Regulations. The same
prohibitory language appears in paragraph (b) of section 515.201, with
similar scope and effect. However, as will be seen in the discussion that
follows, licensing policy with respect to Cuba has been more flexible. 16
The Foreign Funds Control Regulations 17 as they now stand are a
vestige of the World War II program administered by the Foreign Funds
Control, the predecessor to the present Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) which administers all of these Treasury programs. At the height
of World War II, the Control had blocked virtually the entire world,
bringing approximately $7 billion worth of blocked assets under the control of the regulations. 18 Currently, these regulations apply only to small
amounts of blocked assets belonging to Czechoslovakia, East Germany,
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. This program is not directly relevant to the
concerns of this article, although the program and the cases interpreting
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it are often pertinent to an understanding of the concepts and purposes of
the other, more active programs administered by Treasury.
The Iranian Assets Control Regulations 19 arose under a new emergency
statute, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. 20 These Regulations originally prohibited a wide range of commercial and financial
transactions involving the Government of Iran, entities controlled by the
government, and (to a more limited extent) individual Iranian nationals.
However, the blocking imposed by these Regulations is limited to the
assets of the government and its controlled entities. Hence, the impact of
these Regulations on Iranian refugees and expatriates is negligible.
One example should bring the impact of the Treasury controls upon
refugees into focus. Mr. A, a national of a foreign country, has a bank
account in the United States, and he is the majority stockholder of a
corporation which also has property in the United States. Mr. A s home
country is one with which the United States is beginning to experience
foreign policy difficulties. Eventually, the foreign country expropriates or
nationalizes all assets in which U.S. nationals have an interest. Relations
between the two countries worsen, and the United States takes steps to
block the assets of that foreign country and its nationals. Hence, no transactions involving any of this property may occur without a license from
Treasury.
The initial effect of all this on Mr. A is devastating. His account is
blocked; the U.S. assets of his corporation suffer under the same prohibition. While he remains in his home country, he cannot make any valid
transfer of any of these assets. If Mr. A, whose politics are out of favor at
home, flees the country and makes his way to the United States, he will
probably be able to use his own account, 21 but not that of his corporation. 22 Mr. A's situation is typical, but there are other variations on his
story which will suggest themselves as the impact of blocking on individuals who become refugees or expatriates is examined.

UNBLOCKING THE ASSETS OF INDIVIDUALS
Unblocking the assets of individuals is a genuine issue only in the context
of the Foreign Assets and the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. The
assets of individuals are not blocked under the Iranian Assets Control
Regulations, 23 and there is no practical issue with respect to the vestigial
blocking of World War II assets.
The blocking provisions of both the Foreign Assets and Cuban Assets
Control Regulations apply to assets in which there is an interest of either
the designated foreign country or any national thereof. 24 The term "national," or more particularly "designated national," is an extremely broad
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one, encompassing even individuals who would not normally be considered nationals of the designated country as a matter of general principles
of international law. 25 For example, by definition, the term "designated
national" would include not only a citizen or national of the designated
country, but also anyone who was domiciled or resident within the designated country on or after the pertinent effective date, or who had been
acting for or on behalf of the designated country itself. 26 Hence, it is likely
that most individuals who eventually become refugees would be, by definition, designated nationals. That being the case, any assets subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States in which they have an interest would be
blocked.
The policy issue, then, is what to do about these individuals once they
have left the designated country and have effectively severed their ties
with it. The licensing provisions which deal with the blocked property of
individuals attempt to take into account, to the extent consistent with the
purposes of the regulations, the movement of individuals after the effective date. The "license" which would be issued by the OFAC is a written
authorization permitting a transaction or type of transaction that would
otherwise be prohibited by the regulations. A transaction may be authorized either by a "general license," which is a provision in the regulations
authorizing by its own terms a described type of transaction, or by a
"specific license," for which an application would have to be made with
OFAC for review on a case-by-case basis. 27
For the most part, the provisions of the Foreign Assets and Cuban
Assets Control Regulations are parallel on these issues. Under the Foreign
Assets Control Regulations, any person in the United States, regardless of
citizenship or nationality, is generally considered an unblocked national,
with unrestricted access to his or her property. However, anyone who on
or since the effective date has been in the designated country, or has acted
or purported to act for that country, is not unblocked by this general
license. Such an individual must proceed by way of a specific license
application. 28 If, on the other hand, an individual is paroled into the
United States pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act at any time,
he or she is also considered an unblocked national under the Foreign Assets
Control Regulations. 29 This general license does not apply to an individual
who has acted or purported to act for or on behalf of any designated
country. Under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, any individual
physically resident in and within the United States is unblocked unless he
or she has acted for or on behalf of Cuba on or after the effective date, or
0
is otherwise a "specially designated national." 3
It may be that the individual has sought refuge in a third country. If he
was within the "authorized trade territory" 31 (what used to be referred to
as the "Free World") as of the effective date, he may be an unblocked
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national, unless he has been in, or has acted for, the designated foreign
country at any time on or since the effective date. 32 This rule applies to
both the Foreign Assets and Cuban Assets Control Regulations.
For an individual who does not qualify for a license, but who is outside
the designated country, some provisions license certain limited remittances
to the individual from any blocked account in his or her name for living,
travel, and personal expenses. 33 If these amounts are not sufficient, a
specific license application, demonstrating in detail the necessary living
expenses of the applicant, can be filed with the Office.
Another case that might arise is a blocked joint account in which one
of the owners has emigrated to the United States, as an unblocked national,
whereas the other is still a blocked national. Here, a specific license could
be issued unblocking a portion or all of a blocked joint account where the
nonblocked party claims beneficial ownership. 34 Documentary evidence is
required to demonstrate the extent of the joint owner's interest if the
account does not have a survivorship provision. If there are survivorship
provisions, then a pro rata share is licensable without such documentation.
This rule for joint accounts applies to both the Foreign Assets and
Cuban Assets Control Regulations. However, under the Cuban Assets
Control Regulations, there are also special provisions concerning community property rights upon the death of a spouse who was a blocked
national at the time of his or her death. These provisions are examined
5
below in the discussion of estate problems under the regulations. 3

TREATMENT OF ASSETS OF BUSINESS ENTITIES IN WHICH
REFUGEES OR EXPATRIATES HAVE AN INTEREST
The rules for the treatment of blocked assets of business entities in which
refugees or expatriates have an interest are virtually identical under the
Foreign Assets and Cuban Assets Control Regulations. There are different
rules for the three basic types of business entities: sole proprietorships,
partnerships, and corporations. Other hybrid types of entities (for example, joint ventures and "limited companies") occur less frequently and are
handled by analogy to those three prototypes. Each of the three is the
subject of a statement of licensing policy; that is, a provision in the regulations setting forth the conditions under which a specific license would be
granted.
In the case of sole proprietorships, the assets held in the name of a
blocked sole proprietorship, less any obligations owed to persons in
blocked countries, can be unblocked if the proprietor has emigrated from
a designated country and has established residence in the United States or
the "authorized trade territory." 36 Naturally, in cases of doubt the pur-
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ported proprietor would have to demonstrate that his or her business is in
fact a sole proprietorship.
In the case of partnerships, general or limited, the assets held in the
name of a blocked partnership, less any obligations owed to persons in
blocked countries, can be unblocked if all the general and limited partners
have emigrated from the designated country and have established residence in the United States or the "authorized trade territory." 37 Again, in
cases of doubt the applicant must demonstrate that the entity in question
is in fact a partnership. Furthermore, if not all the partners are known to
have emigrated, a license can be obtained unblocking the pro rata shares of
the partners who have emigrated. 38
The case of the blocked corporation has raised most of the serious
litigation concerning Treasury licensing policy with respect to business
entities. Present policy is not to unblock the assets of blocked corporations,
regardless of the present whereabouts of the shareholders and other interested parties. The underlying reason for this is that the corporation is a
separate juridical entity whose own assets are blocked by the regulations.
There always remains the possibility of claims by the blocked country on
behalf of such corporations at the time of settlement negotiations.
Nevertheless, the rule is a hard one from the point of view of refugee
shareholders, and it has been the source of some controversy.
The key case on this issue is Neilsen v. Secretary of the Treasury.39 There the
plaintiffs, Cuban expatriates, owned 75 percent of the shares of a Cuban
corporation which the Cuban Government had seized, and eventually
closed, approximately six months after the effective date of the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations. OFAC considered obligations owed to the
corporation by the U.S. Navy (for work performed after the effective date
but before the seizure) as blocked. Plaintiffs sued for unblocking, and
argued that the Cuban Government did not have an interest in these
corporate assets because the company had been confiscated. Plaintiffs contended that this fact would justify the court in "piercing the corporate veil"
and treating property held in the name of the corporation as belonging to
the shareholders. In rejecting the argument that expropriation terminates
the interest of the designated foreign government in the company's U.S.
assets for blocking purposes, the court noted:
A nation may have scope to effectuate its policies concerning assets within
its jurisdiction without being bound by technical considerations of corporate
entity and corporate domicile. But certainly it is at least presumptively acting
reasonably, and without being subject to the charge of arbitrary or tyrannical
action, if it assumes that assets owned by a Cuban corporation are indeed
assets in which there is a Cuban national interest.
The reasonableness of this approach is heightened by the possibility, perhaps
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the likelihood, that the foreign country will assert an interest in the assets
of corporations organized under its laws....
It is not unreasonable for the American authorities to treat the property of
a Cuban corporation as a matter of Cuban interest and concern, when this
and future Cuban governments are likely, with some support in fundamental
40
legal principles, to assert such an interest.

This view has recently been endorsed by the Northern District of California in Tran Qui Than v. Blumenthal,41 a 1979 decision. There the plaintiff,
a refugee and shareholder in one of the largest commercial banks in South
Vietnam before its fall, claimed personally, or by assignment, the majority
of the bank's stock. He sought to obtain funds owed by the U.S. Government to the bank; Treasury considered the funds blocked and denied a
license. Plaintiff then sought a declaration that the Foreign Assets Control
Regulations were inapplicable to these funds.
Plaintiff argued that Neilsen could be distinguished because here the
bank had been expropriated and ceased to function before the effective
date of the Regulations, so that there was no extant interest in the U.S.situs assets other than those of plaintiff. The court rejected this view:
A government with the power to expropriate also has the power to assert a
claim as the successor to an expropriated bank's foreign-based assets. It is
clear, therefore, that the mere fact of expropriation by Vietnam prior to the
42
effective date does not distinguish this case from Neilsen.

Following Neilsen, the court in Tran Qui Than held that the blocking of
the bank's assets was within Treasury's authority, and that the refusal to
license did not violate the plaintiff's rights to due process or equal protection. 43 This case is currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
In the Neilsen case, the court considered the argument that this approach
to blocked corporate assets conflicts with the results in Kaufrman v. Societe
InternationalePour ParticipationsIndustrielleset Commerciales, .A. 4 4 and Taterka v.
Brownell, 45 two cases of World War II vintage, involving suits under section
9(a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act. 46 This section allows nonenemy
claimants to recover their interests in "vested" property; that is, property
which has been expropriated by the U.S. Government because of the
interests of enemy nationals in the property.
Kaufman involved a suit brought by a Swiss corporation against the U.S.
Government under section 9(a) for the return of corporate assets which the
government had blocked and subsequently vested because the corporation
appeared to be enemy-controlled. The Supreme Court held that the U.S.
minority shareholders of the corporation had standing to intervene in the
suit, since the rights of such nonenemy shareholders might not be ade-
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quately protected by the corporate plaintiff, yet any final judgment in the
case would bind them. In allowing intervention, the Supreme Court stated
that
when the [U.S.] Government seizes assets of a corporation organized under
the laws of a neutral country, the rights of innocent stockholders to an
interest in the assets ... must be fully protected. This holding is not based
on any technical concept of derivative rights appropriate to the law of corporations. It is based on the [Trading With the Enemy] Act which enables one
not an enemy ... to recover any interest, right or title which he has in the
property vested. The innocent stockholder may not have title to corporate
assets, but he does have an interest which Congress has indicated should not
be confiscated merely because some others who have like interests are enemies. 47
The Kaufman rule was extended to innocent stockholders of enemy corporations in Taterka. 48 These and similar cases were cited by plaintiffs in
both Neilsen and Tran Qui Than, and in each the court specifically rejected
the argument that the Kaufman rule was authority for the release of corporate assets which had been blocked by the U.S. Government but title to
which had not been vested in the name of the U.S. Government. On the
question whether the Kaufman rule was a precedent in the unblocking
context, the Neilsen court stated:
Congress permitted [vesting] when the ownership and control of what was
in form a neutral corporation was in substance tainted by enemy interests.
The [Kaufman ] Court construed the relevant provisions of the Trading With
the Enemy Act [concerning vesting] as permitting the government to pierce
the corporate veil, because of the interest of enemy stockholders, but
...in that event the government must protect the position of innocent
stockholders....

We have no occasion to consider whether or not the ruling of Taterka is
correct. Assuming that it is, it stands at most as an interpretation of the
provisions of sections 2 and 9(a) of the Trading With the Enemy Act as
applicable to assets that were not only blocked ...

but were vested ....

If the blocking of Cuban assets ... is followed by vesting action, the vesting
need not be under Section 5(b) of [the Trading With the Enemy] Act.
And perhaps Congress will not adopt the same companion provisions when
and if it passes a statute authorizing the vesting of Cuban assets. 49
In one respect the rule on assets of blocked corporations has been
ameliorated. The assets of blocked corporations wholly or substantially
owned by U.S. citizens on the effective date of the regulations can be
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unblocked by specific license. This is an explicitly stated policy in the
Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 5 0 and the same policy is followed in
administering the Foreign Assets Control Regulations.
This policy was developed in response to hearings on amendments to
the International Claims Settlement Act . 5 1 A Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Report 5 2 and a House Report 5 3 expressed disapproval of any
practice which would be "tantamount to using the property of one U.S.
citizen to pay the claim of another U.S. citizen." 5 4 The House Report
suggested
that a thorough examination be made by the Department of the Treasury on
a case-by-case basis to determine from the evidence and equities involved
in each case the proper disposition of U.S. national owned blocked assets and
that, where proper, it unblock U.S. privately owned assets. 55
Hence, Congress had indicated that blocked assets which were indirectly those of U.S. citizens would not be used in any future claims settlement,
but Congress made no similar finding as to corporate assets claimed by
refugees. Responding to this suggestion of Congress, Treasury developed
the policy of allowing for a case-by-case procedure to consider whether
blocked corporate assets actually involve interests of U.S. stockholders. To
date, however, no relief has been provided for nonblocked individuals who
were not U.S. nationals as of the date the blocking took effect.
It is particularly suggestive that Congress recommended this change of
treatment for certain types of blocked corporate assets in the context of its
consideration of amendments to the International Claims Settlement Act.
This Act authorizes the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (now an
agency of the Department of Justice) to adjudicate claims of U.S. nationals
against certain specified countries, including, for example, Cuba and the
People'e Republic of China. 56 Claimants who were aliens as of the date
of loss are explicitly excluded from the claims adjudication process. Since
they are also excluded from Congress' recommendation concerning
blocked corporate assets, it is reasonable to assume that such assets could
be used to satisfy U.S. claims pursuant to a claims settlement agreement
negotiated at some future time. The policy reasons most blocked assets are
held indefinitely, against the possibility that they may be involved in a
claims settlement with the designated country, are explored in the last
section of this article.

TREATMENT OF ESTATE PROBLEMS
If a blocking program lasts long enough, as most of them have, new issues
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arise in the area of estate law. Assume that Mr. A's father remains in the
blocked country from which Mr. A has already emigrated. The father has
a bank account or other property within the United States, but Mr. A finds
that he cannot draw on the account because it is blocked under the regulations. The differences between the United States and the blocked country
continue unresolved, and in the interim, A's father dies in the blocked
country. Are his blocked assets freed at that point to pass to his next of
kin, Mr. A and his nephew X, who happen to be in the United States? The
short answer is "no." The transfer of property to them, by intestate succession or otherwise, is still a "transfer" involving property in which a
blocked national has had an interest since the effective date. Hence, no
transfer, by operation of law or otherwise, can occur without a license.
The licensing policies in the area of estates are complicated. Though the
policies under the Foreign Assets and Cuban Assets Control Regulations
are again quite similar, there are significant differences between them
because the Cuban Regulations include provisions dealing with spousal
community property rights.
There are certain provisions which these two sets of regulations share,
First, a general license authorizes the minimal ministerial transactions
necessary to administer a decedent's estate. 57 (For example, Mr. A could
be appointed administrator of his father's estate.) Furthermore, a general
license permits any U.S. bank or trust company to make distributions
under an estate or trust of a non-blocked decedent, provided that any
distributions to a blocked national are made into a blocked account in a
domestic bank in the name of the blocked national. 58 Hence, if Mr. A, Mr.
X, and Xs sister Mrs. Y (who is still blocked) are all beneficiaries under
a trust established by Z, a U.S. national who is A's uncle, distributions may
be freely made to A and X, but the distributions to Ymust be made into
a blocked account in a U.S. bank.
Another general license permits transfers by operation of laws governing, for example, dower, curtesy or community property where the end
result is the creation of a blocked interest which remains subject to U.S.
jurisdiction. 5 9 As a general rule, however, no such transfers are permitted
where the effect would be to transfer assets out of blocked status.
The Foreign Assets and Cuban Assets Control Regulations also share
certain ground rules pertaining to the treatment of blocked life insurance
policies. Transactions to maintain or service blocked life insurance policies
are authorized by general license, under certain conditions. 60 Payment of
the proceeds of blocked life insurance policies can be made to nonblocked
individuals by specific license only after deduction of an amount equal to
the cash surrender value of the policy. (The cash surrender value remains
blocked as representing the absolute minimum amount readily available to
the deceased up until the time of his death.) However, where the insurance
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policy provides that the proceeds are to be paid to the estate of the
deceased blocked national, rather than to named beneficiaries, the entire
amount remains blocked in the name of the estate of the deceased.
The treatment of blocked life insurance policies does reveal some divergence between the Foreign Assets and Cuban Assets Control Regulations.
Under the Cuban Regulations, if a nonblocked surviving spouse is a beneficiary of the policy, the spouse may also be authorized, by specific license, to receive up to 50 percent of the cash surrender value of the
policy. 61
This exception, which attempts to take into consideration the spouse's
personal interest in community property under the civil law principles
governing in Cuba, is in accord with a broader licensing policy governing
blocked bank accounts of deceased blocked Cuban nationals. As mentioned above, specific licenses are granted unblocking up to 50 percent of
such accounts in favor of the nonblocked surviving spouse who claims a
beneficial interest in all or part of the account. Documentary proof of the
beneficial interest is not required for this 50 percent share.
Joint accounts are given similar treatment under the Cuban Regulations.
Where a bank account is held jointly in the names of husband and wife,
a surviving spouse may receive 50 percent under the joint accounts licensing policy, discussed previously, or 50 percent under the community property licensing policy, but not both. Independent documentary proof of a
beneficial interest would be required for any amount in excess of 50 per62
cent of the account.
The licensing provisions with respect to blocked estates have engendered some litigation, and by and large the courts have upheld them. In
1975, Real v. Simon 63 challenged the policy with respect to blocked estates.
The Fifth Circuit held that the Regulations could not block the estate of
a deceased Cuban national if all the heirs were unblocked nationals. 64 In
reaching its decision, the court relied on the Senate's recommendation,
referred to above, 65 that assets of one group of U.S. nationals not be used
to satisfy the claims of others. The court reasoned that blocking an estate
in which all individual parties in interest are unblocked would run contrary
to the rationale the Congress suggested with respect to corporate assets.
This case would seem to be a rather clear victory for refugees seeking
to recover blocked assets in which they have an interest. The court's
reasoning is, however, overwrought. The Second Circuit disapproved Real
in Richardson v. Simon, 66 and even within the Fifth Circuit itself, the Southern District of Florida in Ferrera v. United States67 strictly limited Real to its
specific facts, holding that, if any of the beneficiaries of a blocked estate
remained a blocked national, the estate assets also remained blocked.
In Richardson, the Second Circuit upheld Treasury's decision to bar the
transfer of a deceased Cuban national's property to an American citizen by
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intestate succession. The court found that the congressional reports relied
on in Realprovided little support for the decision. It agreed with the district
court which had found that the recommendation contained in the Senate
report "referred only to those assets in the United States which were
beneficially owned by Americans on or before.., the date the freeze went
into effect." 68 In both Real and Richardson, on the effective date of the
regulations the assets were owned by blocked Cuban nationals, later
deceased.
The Real court also erroneously identified the policy purposes served by
the regulations, by limiting them to one: the need to retain blocked assets
for possible use in satisfaction of U.S. claims against Cuba. It believed that
only this purpose could be advanced in support of Treasury blocking
action. On this basis, it concluded that that purpose was not properly
served by the blocking of the estate assets in question. The Richardson court
noted to the contrary that when the government blocked the assets of a
Cuban national they became available not only for direct use in satisfying
U.S. claims, but also as a bargaining chip in any future negotiations with
the designated country. The issue of how to treat such assets in light of
the possibility of future, as yet unformulated, negotiations was in the first
instance properly a question for the executive and legislative branches. 69

LITIGATION INVOLVING BLOCKED ASSETS
Perhaps the most obvious way in which a refugee or expatriate can make
good his or her claims against his or her former homeland is to bring suit
in the courts of the country of refuge. It is beyond the purview of this
paper to discuss the more typical problems which face such a litigant, for
instance, the problems of establishing jurisdiction in a convenient forum,
overcoming act of state and sovereign immunity defenses, and obtaining
evidence. What is at issue here is the extent to which the blocking of the
defendant state's assets limits the ability of a successful plaintiff to recover
out of such assets.
The basic blocking provision in each set of regulations prohibits, among
other things, "transfers" involving property in which a designated country
or its nationals have any interest. The term "transfer" includes by definition "the issuance, docketing, filing, or the levy of or under any judgment,
decree, attachment, execution, or other judicial or administrative process
or order, or the service of any garnishment." 70 Unless otherwise licensed,
"any attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other
judicial process is null and void." 71
The regulations include, however, a general license authorizing judicial
proceedings up to, but not including, entry of a judgment or order of
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similar nature or effect. 72 This general license includes pre-judgment attachments, but transfer of the attached assets to the marshal, sheriff, or
similar functionary, and payment into court are not authorized by the
license. At judgment stage, an application for a specific license would be
necessary. Hence, direct recovery by refugees and expatriates out of
blocked assets of their former homeland is subject to the licensing policies
of the regulations.
Under the Foreign Assets and Cuban Assets Control Regulations, specific licenses have on occasion been issued for entry of non-self-executing
judgments, but no execution under the judgment against blocked property
has been authorized. 73 To allow execution would, in effect, prejudge the
outcome of claims adjudication and settlement negotiations yet to take
place. If executions were licensed, claimants with judgments would be
allowed to recover 100 percent of their claims, while others might receive
only pro rata shares of their claims from any fund created by a claims
settlement agreement.
Furthermore, in the case of claims by refugees and expatriates, execution under a license might be tantamount to espousing the claims of individuals who were not U.S. nationals at the time of loss. This result would
run counter to past U.S. practice under claims adjudication programs under
the International Claims Settlement Act, 74 as mentioned above (and thus
under any future adjudication program following these historical
models 75). At the very least such claims would be questionable for purposes of diplomatic protection as a matter of international law. 76 At least
in theory, these principles of international law would govern any future
claims negotiations with the foreign country in question, and it may therefore be inappropriate for the U.S. Government to deplete significantly the
pool of blocked assets available for claims settlement negotiations in favor
of individuals whose claims the U.S. Government could not espouse.
On several occasions the courts have upheld Treasury's assertion of
authority over judicial proceedings involving blocked assets. Considering
the prohibitions of the Foreign Funds Control Regulations, for example,
the Supreme Court held in Propperv. Clark77 that judicial action purporting
to transfer title to property was invalid where the property was already
blocked. In Propperthe Court invalidated a transfer effected by the judicial
appointment of a permanent receiver of blocked Austrian assets.
Similarly, in Orvis v. Brownell,78 the Court held that a state attachment
order created no interest in blocked property that the claimant could assert
against the Alien Property Custodian who had subsequently vested the
attached property. In Orvis the Court upheld the power of the president to
prohibit the creation or termination of interests in blocked property. The
Court rejected a narrower interpretation of the Trading With the Enemy
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Act which would have limited the prohibition to actual, physical transfers
of assets.
This view was followed in Chase Manhattan Bank v. United China Syndicate,
Ltd., 79 a 1960 case in which the Southern District of New York ruled, in
light of the prohibitions in the Foreign Assets Control Regulations, that
"this Court may not direct the entry of any judgment at the present time
in the absence of a license permitting such entry of judgment." 8 0
One case concerning the Foreign Assets Control Regulations has disputed this conclusion. Vishipco v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 81 an unreported 1978
decision of the Southern District of New York, involved a demand by
Vietnamese expatriates for blocked assets held by Chase Manhattan. Judge
Carter held that the Regulations did not constitute a bar to entry of judgment in cases involving blocked assets. This decision relied heavily on the
court's interpretation of the Supreme Court's 1964 decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,8 2 which did not directly involve a question of the
validity of the Regulations. In response to an inquiry from the solicitor
general, a letter from the acting director of OFAC 8 3 stated that the Office
had no objection to the continuation of the proceedings in Sabbatino. In
Vishipco, Judge Carter argued that this position supported his conclusion
that the Regulations were never intended to bar entry of judgment.
To the contrary, the government's position is that Sabbatinois consistent
with current practice under the Regulations. The United States Government was not a party to the Vishipco case, and the court's decision was
reached without benefit of any argument from the government concerning
the proper interpretation of the Sabbatino case. In fact, as other Treasury
correspondence to counsel in Sabbatino would have indicated to the court,
OFAC "regard[ed] [the] letter... to the Solicitor General as constituting
a license authorizing continuance of the litigation and entry of judgment
both in the Supreme Court and in subsequent proceedings by the District
Court." 84
Treasury's policy that a license is required to enter judgment in judicial
proceedings involving blocked property has been consistently applied
throughout the history of the blocking program. Yet the Vishipco court
noted that the government's amicus brief in Sabbatinostated that "the Regulations impose no barrier to the continuation of the litigation in this case
nor the entry of a judgment for petitioner." 8 5 The simple explanation of
this statement is that the Regulations posed no barrier because the proceedings and entry of judgment were licensed.
Had the government presented its views in Vishipico, this fact would
have been before the court. Another fact should have been obvious, however, even without the government's intervention. The district court initially decided Sabbatino on March 31, 1961,86 and the Second Circuit
affirmed on July 6, 1962.87 No license for instituting the litigation or
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entering judgment at those stages was necessary because Cuban assets
were not blocked at that time. It was not until July 8, 1963, that the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations were issued. 88 Hence, Judge Carter's unreported decision in Vishipco appears to have been based on a misinterpretation
of the letter from the Office of Foreign Assets Control to the solicitor
general in connection with Sabbafino, as well as a misunderstanding of the
facts surrounding the litigation. 89

CONCLUSION
What treatment, then, may refugees and expatriates expect in light of
Treasury's blocking controls? Individually owned assets are automatically
unblocked if the individuals were fortunate enough to emigrate before the
blocking occurred. If emigration postdated the blocking, they may seek a
specific license unblocking the assets.
Blocked assets of business entities owned by refugees and expatriates
will be available to them by specific license, except in the case of corporate
assets; these remain blocked. The situation is less favorable with respect
to estate assets, though some relief is available in limited circumstances.
Certainly, the chance of recovery from blocked assets in litigation is perhaps the bleakest prospect under the regulations.
The question, then, is why are the prospects so bleak? On other issues
involving humanitarian considerations, the policy of the regulations has
yielded hopeful results. For example, remittances from U.S. residents to
close family relatives in blocked countries have been permitted, both for
support and for emigration purposes. 90 Travel and exchange, which fosters contacts between separated families, have been authorized. 91 But
where blocked assets are involved, the policy locks into place almost
inflexibly.
The answer, satisfactory or not, is to be found in the policy purposes
which have traditionally triggered blocking controls. These purposes are,
by and large, at cross-purposes with efforts to relieve the situation of
refugees and expatriates, perhaps necessarily so.
The controls obviously respond to a wide variety of foreign policy
concerns and objectives. They have emerged over the entire World War II
and postwar period. Hence, a variety of purposes lie behind these regulations, and the purposes of any given set of regulations may have shifted
over time in terms of relative emphasis. However, five primary purposes
can be identified which generally apply, to a greater or lesser extent, to all
the regulations.
Historically, the earliest purpose behind the regulations, that is, behind
the Foreign Funds Control Regulations at the time they were first issued,

414

TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES

was to prevent the conversion of the U.S. assets of foreign nationals
through duress or extortion by officials of a hostile foreign government.
This purpose dates to the period immediately prior to the entry of the
United States into World War II. At that time, with the invasion of Norway and Denmark by Nazi Germany, there was considerable fear that
officials of the occupying power might extort transfers of the U.S. property
of nationals of those countries. 92
As occupation by the Axis powers spread, and as the United States
became directly involved in the war, other purposes emerged. There was
an "economic warfare" cast to the prohibitions at this point, and a primary
purpose of the regulations was to deny to hostile foreign governments and
their nationals foreign exchange and access to U.S.-situs assets. This purpose had obvious application to the wartime situation, but it continues to
be an important objective in present circumstances. 93
Related to this purpose was the desire to effect the economic and political isolation of hostile foreign governments. This, too, has continued as a
purpose of the current regulations, 94 although such isolation is more difficult to achieve in a world where there is no international consensus as to
who is the so-called "enemy."
Another goal which has been stressed more in circumstances where
active hostilities are not proceeding has been to retain a pool of blocked
assets as a "bargaining chip" for any future negotiations with the designated foreign country. 95
More specifically, there is a desire to secure a pool of blocked assets
against the contingency that they may be used, directly or indirectly, in
satisfying claims of U.S. nationals against the foreign government in96
volved.
As all these purposes suggest, the controls have not been formulated
primarily with regard to, or directed against, individuals who become
refugees or expatriates. Indeed, only the first purpose bears any easily
identifiable relationship to the refugee problem. The prevention of conversion of assets under duress may in fact redound to the eventual benefit of
an individual who becomes a refugee and who might then have a need for
and access to his U.S. assets.
However, aside from this factual connection with refugees, as a conceptual matter, in terms of the broad U.S. foreign policy objectives primarily
served by these controls, the impact on individual refugees or expatriates
with interests in blocked property is incidental. Still, it would be disingenuous to deny that the impact of these controls as a practical matter can
be acute and serious. If the blocking of assets of a designated country
extends to the assets of its nationals, then, in the absence of provisions for
unblocking those assets by license, blocking can create serious problems
for the refugee who has an interest in blocked property. Nevertheless,
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these controls do contain provisions which have the effect, in some limited
instances, of minimizing the impact on some refugees through general and
specific licenses.
Still, the overriding foreign policy stance here dictates caution and
circumspection in dealing with blocked assets. Future contingencies, particularly with respect to the shape of a claims settlement at some undetermined time in the future, have traditionally counselled maintenance of the
status quo with respect to blocked assets. On the other hand, humanitarian
and other similar concerns may dictate licensing in many instances. The
controls described in this article are an example of an attempt, perhaps a
halting attempt, by the U.S. Government to give appropriate weight to
these conflicting policy objectives and values. The balance of factors may
seem precarious, but, as the Supreme Court observed in a somewhat different context:
[I]f, in the maintenance of our international relations ....
embarrassment .

.

perhaps serious

. is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved,

congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation
and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President
a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would'
not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved. 97
It is not an easy duty, nor a happy choice, to balance the needs of national
interest against the impact on individuals caught, often innocently, in the
confrontation between two nations.
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7 31 C.F.R. § 500.201(b) (1980). This provision reads in pertinent part as follows:
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